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.Agricultural Product Loads and Warehouse Failures 
Norbert Delatte, M.ASCE1 
Abstract: Two manufactured metal building warehouses loaded with agricultural products failed in service. Inspection revealed con­
siderable damage to the structure and the foundation. The building owner filed suit against the building supplier, the building erector, and 
the soils testing laboratory whose engineer had designed the foundation. The agricultural product imposed substantial outward lateral 
pressures on the walls of the structures. Review of the available design documents indicated that these loads had not been accounted for 
in design. A structural analysis revealed that elements of the structure were underdesigned for the agricultural product loads. In addition, 
the foundation did not have any slab reinforcement to resist the loads. To prevent similar failures, these loads must be accounted for in 
design. The steel structure design and foundation design were both deficient. A contributing factor was the lack of communication between 
the designer of the structure and the designer of the foundation, due to the lack of a single engineer of record to take responsibility for the 
buildings. 
CE Database keywords: Structural failure; Litigation; Loads; Building design. 
Introduction 
Two manufactured metal buildings were purchased and erected 
for use as agricultural product storage warehouses. The product 
stored was cottonseed. The cottonseed was separated from the 
seed in a gin building adjacent to each warehouse, and then blown 
in for storage until it could be sold. The blower loaded the ware­
houses from one end, with the product removed through a door at 
the other end. The warehouses were intended to be fully loaded 
with the product. Once the pile of cottonseed reached the peak of 
the roof, an auger built into the roof was used to move it toward 
the door. The warehouse storage capability would allow the 
owner to store cottonseed until it could be sold at a higher price. 
The two warehouses were located in towns about 32 km (20 mi) 
apart. 
For two years, the warehouses were only partially loaded. Dur­
ing the third season, the warehouses were loaded to the roof, and 
workers outside of the building observed outward bulging of the 
warehouse walls. Once the product was removed, the concrete 
floor slabs were found to be badly cracked. The structure was also 
damaged, with evidence of permanent deformation. Much of the 
outward bulging disappeared when the cottonseed was removed, 
but the distortion in the metal walls remained. 
The owner filed suit against the metal building manufacturer, 
the erector, and the soil testing company that had prepared the 
foundation design. The owner’s attorney retained the author as an 
expert witness. 
Inspection 
The author first inspected the two warehouses in August 1999. 
Both warehouses were empty. Each warehouse was 24.4 by 42.7 
m (80 by 140 ft) in plan. The side warehouse walls were just over 
7.26 m (23 ft 10 in.) high, with the roof rising at a 45° angle to a 
peak 18.3 m (60 ft) high. One of the warehouses is shown in Fig. 
1. The auger, intended to move the product from the loading end 
to the door, was at the peak of the roof. 
The structural configuration of both warehouses was identical. 
The interior framing of one of the warehouses is shown in Fig. 2. 
Six gable frames are spaced at 6.1 m (20 ft) intervals. Between 
the gable frames are interior soldier columns. The tops of the 
interior soldier columns are restrained by steel angle bracing lead­
ing back to the gable frames. Each of the pair of braces at the top 
of each column has two parts, with bolts attaching them to other 
parts of the structural secondary framing. The first and last bays 
have x-bracing for longitudinal stability of the structure. Each end 
wall had seven columns. 
These structures were purchased with an interior liner, so the 
inner and outer walls of the building were separated by purlins. 
Flange braces were provided to brace the side and end wall col­
umns against lateral-torsional buckling and had been attached to 
the inner liner panel with self-tapping screws. 
The inspection of warehouse 1 revealed the following damage: 
1.	 On the right side of the far end of the warehouse (loading 
end), the top of the wall had been torn outward. This is 
shown in Fig. 3. From inside the warehouse, the sky was 
visible through the gap. 
2.	 The interior liner of the wall at the far end of the warehouse 
showed signs of permanent distortion (wrinkling) due to out­
ward bulging. 
3.	 A large number of the flange braces on the end walls had 
been torn away from the interior liner and were hanging 
down. This is illustrated in Fig. 4. The cotton lint pattern in 
this figure also provided an indication of how high the seed 
was piled at the end wall. Some flange braces along the side 
walls were also torn away, as shown in Fig. 2. More flange 
braces were torn away lower on the walls than higher up. 
Fig. 1. Exterior view of warehouse 
4.	 The concrete slab foundation was badly cracked. Cracks ran 
near the bases of the side wall columns nearest to the end 
wall. Cracks on the right-hand side near the end wall are 
shown in Fig. 5. Cracks also ran parallel to the end wall. 
Cracks were approximately 3– 6 mm (1/8 to 1/4 in.) wide. 
Some cracks ran about 100 mm (4 in.) from the inner col­
umn flange, and some were about 1 m (3 ft) from the inner 
column flange. 
5.	 Overall, the greatest damage was closest to the end wall. The 
door ends had almost no damage. 
The inspection of warehouse 2 revealed the following damage: 
1.	 On the left side of the far end of the warehouse (loading 
end), a brace holding back the top of an interior soldier col­
umn had been torn away. This is shown in Fig. 6. 
2.	 The wall at the far end of the warehouse showed signs of 
permanent distortion, similar to warehouse 1. 
3.	 Some flange braces on the end wall and along the side walls 
had been torn away, similar to warehouse 1. 
4.	 The concrete slab foundation cracking in warehouse 2 was 
worse than in warehouse 1. A large crack about 25 mm (1 
in.) wide, shown in Fig. 7, ran parallel to the end wall. The 
height differential across the crack was approximately 3 mm 
(1/8 in.), with the side next to the wall lower. On the left side 
wall, the three columns closest to the end wall had D-shaped 
cracks around them, and a large crack ran parallel to the wall 
just over 1 m (3 ft) from the wall. 
Fig. 3. Damage at eave line 
5.	 As in warehouse 1, the greatest damage was closest to the 
end wall. 
A second inspection was made in October 2000 to verify the 
previous observations. At this time, some seed was stored on the 
floor of warehouse 1, but the pile did not extend to the walls of 
the building. The damage was no worse, but the buildings had not 
been fully loaded with seed in the meantime. The need to keep the 
Fig. 2. Warehouse interior framing Fig. 4. Column flange braces torn away at end wall 
Fig. 5. Cracking near side wall columns 
seed from piling up against the wall reduced the storage capacity 
of the warehouses to a small fraction of the designed capacity. 
Clearly, the buildings had failed and could not be used as in­
tended without risk of further damage and possible collapse. 
Fig. 6. Interior column brace torn, warehouse 2 
However, this manual does not directly address the loads from 
Fig. 7. Cracking near end wall, warehouse 2 
Review of Documents and Depositions 
Following the initial inspection, a number of documents and 
records were obtained and reviewed. Most of the project records 
and reports were available. The attorneys for the plaintiff and for 
the defendants obtained depositions from several dozen individu­
als. The most relevant documents included the metal building 
manufacturer’s records, the soil testing report used for construc­
tion, the foundation design, depositions by the building erector’s 
personnel, results of soil and concrete testing following the build­
ing failure, and a document providing information about the ag­
ricultural product loads. 
Warehouse Steel Structure Designer 
The metal building manufacturer’s plans, shop drawings, and job 
file were available for review. The design had been carried out 
with computer software, following industry practices. The soft­
ware used the direct stiffness method. The Metal Building Manu­
facturer’s Association (MBMA) publishes a manual prescribing 
loads for this type of structure, such as a snow load of 240 Pa (5 
psf) and a wind load of 843 Pa (17.6 psf) based on a wind speed 
of 39.3 m/s (88 mph) for the building location (MBMA 1996). 
These loads were shown in the computer program output in the 
job file. 
agricultural products. These loads were very high, as much as 
6–12 times the wind pressure. Loads due to agricultural product 
were not reflected in the computer program output reviewed by 
the writer. 
The agricultural product loads were shown on one sheet of the 
plans supplied to the erector and owner as horizontal reactions to 
be applied to the foundation slab. This sheet showed only force 
reactions and not moment reactions. A pinned base column is 
often assumed for design of low-rise metal buildings (e.g., Lee 
et al. 1981). Moment reactions occur at the base of a column 
when it is subjected to lateral loads (and acts as a beam-column), 
unless the column base is detailed to allow rotation. The impact of 
this assumption on the building performance is discussed below. 
The steel structure plans were supplied without a foundation 
plan, except for an anchor bolt layout. In accordance with com­
mon industry practice, the plans contained a disclaimer stating 
that the building designer was not assuming liability for founda­
tion, floor, or slab design or construction. The owner was told to 
hire a foundation designer and provide him with the plans. 
Soil Testing and Foundation Design 
The owner hired a soil testing firm (laboratory A) for site testing 
and compaction recommendations. The testing firm prepared rec­
ommendations and provided field density reports during construc­
tion. Some of the testing reports prepared during construction by 
this laboratory suggested higher soil moisture contents and lower 
densities than the recommendations, and it is unclear from the 
record whether these problems were corrected. 
The owner asked the soil testing firm’s licensed engineer to 
prepare a foundation plan. The drawing prepared by the testing 
firm engineer provided a layout with a specification for 27.6 MPa 
(4,000 psi) concrete containing polypropylene fiber reinforcement 
(specified by a trade name). The slab was 125 mm (5 in.) thick 
with an outer turndown beam 406 by 406 mm (16 by 16 in.). A  
footing 1.07 m (42 in.) square was provided under each column. 
Two 15.9 mm (5/8 in.) diameter steel reinforcing bars (desig­
nation 16M, US #5) were specified to be continuous around the 
perimeter of the foundation in the turndown beam, with additional 
bars of the same size in the footer. However, no reinforcing steel 
was specified in the interior of the slab to resist the outward 
horizontal reactions and moments at the column bases. 
The foundation design cover letter stated that a soil support 
value of 120 kPa (2,500 psf) had been used to develop the rec­
ommendations. This was assumed in the writer’s analysis to be 
the ultimate bearing capacity of the soil. 
Building Erector 
Once the foundation was prepared, a construction firm was hired 
to erect the building. Adjustments had to be made during con­
struction because the building was purchased with an interior 
liner, which was not shown on the plans supplied by the metal 
building manufacturer. The liner may be seen in Figs. 2 and 4. 
The original detail for the flange braces showed them bolted to 
the purlins along the walls. However, with the interior liner in 
place, they could not be attached directly to the purlins. There­
fore, the flange braces were attached with self-tapping screws 
installed through the liner panel into the purlins. Furthermore, 
some of the flange braces were field modified to fit by flame 
cutting or similar methods. In some cases, little metal was left for 
attachment. 
Testing Laboratory Results 
One of the defendants’ attorneys hired a testing laboratory (labo­
ratory B) to investigate the soil and concrete slab at each ware­
house. This laboratory had not been previously associated with 
the project. 
At warehouse 1, seven field density tests were performed. 
Densities varied from 89 to 98%. Three of the seven tests were 
less than the 95% density required in laboratory A’s recommen­
dations. Four field density tests were performed at warehouse 2. 
Densities ranged from 83 to 93%, and none met the specification 
prepared by laboratory A. 
At warehouse 2, four concrete cores were removed. One of the 
cores, taken through the nominally 125 mm (5 in.) part of the 
slab, was only 111 mm (4 3/8 in.) long. The others were all taken 
around the perimeter beam. The short core suggests an inadequate 
thickness of the slab for at least one point, but it is not enough to 
form a conclusion. 
Two cores were cut to make a total of five specimens for 
compression testing. Test results were 22.2, 24.1, 29.0, 29.4, and 
31.9 MPa (3,221, 3,497, 4,202, 4,260, and 4,622 psi). Three 
Windsor Probe tests were made on the foundation. The compres­
sive strengths predicted using the Windsor Probe were 23.6, 32.8, 
and 34.3 MPa (3,425, 4,750, and 4,975 psi). 
Agricultural Product Loads 
The owner provided the writer with a document that provided 
information about cottonseed loads. He stated that a copy of this 
document had been provided to the metal building designer and 
other parties. The document was undated, but listed a 1987 refer­
ence. He also provided a photograph of a warehouse in a neigh­
boring state where the end wall had failed due to the outward 
pressure of the agricultural product, and stated that he had shown 
the photograph to the building designer and others. 
According to the document on cottonseed loads, the bulk den­
sity of cottonseed is 400 kg/m3 mass and 3.92 kN/m3 weight (25 
lb/ft3) and has an angle of repose (<) of 45°. The lateral wall 
pressure may be estimated using the following formula: 
WP=kXDXH (1) 
where WP=lateral wall pressure; k=pressure coefficient (0.20, 
based on the angle of repose of 45° and rounded up); D 
=density; and H=height or seed depth (Willcut et al. undated). 
Therefore, with an eave height of 7.26 m (23 ft 10 in.), the pres­
sure at the base of the wall was 5.75 kPa (120 lb/ft2). The pressure 
increases linearly from zero at the top of the wall to a maximum 
value at the bottom. 
Therefore, the resultant of the pressure distribution is 
F= 12 XkXDXH
2XL (2) 
where F=resultant force; L=length of wall between columns 
(3.05 m, or 10 ft); and other variables are as previously defined. 
The resultant force acts at 1/3 H from the bottom of the wall. 
Agricultural product may be analyzed as a cohesionless soil to 
determine lateral pressures. For a cohensionless soil, the active 
earth pressure coefficient k is 
<
k=tan2( 45- ) (3)2 
where <=45°, as noted earlier. This gives an active pressure 
coefficient of 0.172, close to the value of 0.2 suggested by Willcut 
et al. (undated). Eqs. (1)–(3) are the commonly used Rankine 
formulas for active soil pressure, which may be obtained from a 
number of soil mechanics texts, such as Dunn et al. (1980). 
Therefore, along the side walls, each column has an outward 
resultant force of 63.2 kN (14,200 lbs) acting 2.42 m (8 ft) from 
the base of the wall. On the end walls, the outward resultant 
forces are as much as 303 kN (68,000 lbs). 
Since the building is loaded from one end, it is possible to 
have a full load of cottonseed on the far wall, with no load against 
the inside of the near wall (door end). This provides a total force 
of 1,670 kN (375 kips) acting on the rear wall, at a location of 
4.66 m (15.3 ft) from the base of the wall. In fact, this condition 
is not only possible but also unavoidable in the course of operat­
ing the warehouses as intended. 
Failure Hypotheses 
Five hypotheses were considered. These included steel structure 
design error, construction error, foundation design error, low 
strength concrete, or differential settlement. The possibility of an 
extreme loading such as hurricane wind loading, earthquake, or 
another similar event was considered but rejected, since there was 
no evidence that such an event had occurred since the buildings 
had been constructed. As mentioned above, the buildings were 
some distance apart, but exhibited nearly identical distresses. 
Combinations of causes were considered. 
Steel Structure Design Error 
Inadequate design of the steel structure by the metal building 
manufacturer was considered. Supporting evidence included 
structural damage that could not be readily attributed to the foun­
dation failure. The suggested failure mechanism was the outward 
pressure imposed by the stored cottonseed. 
Construction Error 
The possibility that the erector made unauthorized changes during 
construction was considered. The main supporting evidence for 
this hypothesis was the flange brace installation that did not 
match the plans or the shop drawings. The suggested failure 
mechanism was also cottonseed pressure. 
Foundation Design Error 
Review of the documents suggested that the foundation design by 
the engineer employed by laboratory A violated the applicable 
American Concrete Institute (ACI 1995) design provisions and 
was inadequate to resist the building column reactions. Again, the 
failure mechanism would have been cottonseed pressure. 
Low-Strength Concrete 
The strength results noted from the core testing and Windsor 
Probe observed by laboratory B were used by some of the parties 
involved to suggest that the concrete delivered was of inadequate 
quality. Since the foundation loads should have been resisted by 
reinforcing steel to meet the code requirements, it was not clear to 
the writer how this would lead to the observed failure. 
Differential Settlement 
Another suggested contributing factor was the low soil compac­
tion results, observed by laboratory B and also suggested by the 
laboratory A records, which could have led to differential settle­
ment. However, since the critical forces applied were outward, 
and not against the soil, this did not seem as significant as the 
other factors considered. Furthermore, the maximum vertical 
loads of the building and stored cottonseed were about half the 
bearing capacity assumed by the foundation designer and soil test 
company (laboratory A). 
Analysis 
The writer analyzed the structure and foundation to determine 
which of the hypotheses were most likely. This included an analy­
sis of the load path and a structural analysis to determine column 
forces and base moments, concrete slab foundation stresses, col­
umn flange brace forces, interior soldier column top brace forces, 
and overall stability against unbalanced cottonseed loading. 
Load Path 
As part of the structural analysis, it was necessary to determine 
the load path for the cottonseed lateral loads. The cottonseed 
pressed outward against the inner liner of the building. In turn, the 
purlins between the inner liner and the outer skin of the building 
carried the loads horizontally to the columns. The forces were 
transmitted from the purlins to the columns through girt clips and 
the flange braces. Finally, the forces were carried to the founda­
tion through the columns. 
Steel Column Base Moments 
The writer performed a structural analysis to determine the ac­
tions of individual members on the foundation slab. The structural 
analysis computer program results provided by the metal building 
manufacturer indicated that the structural engineer modeled the 
columns as pinned at the base. 
However, the pattern of damage suggested a prying action at 
the base of the most heavily loaded columns. The D-shaped 
cracks around some of the column bases, with cracks propagating 
through the edge turndown beam, provided strong evidence of 
this behavior. The column base plate detail, with bolts 305 mm 
(12 in.) apart, was sufficient to provide a fixed base connection. 
An expert witness for the metal building manufacturer suggested 
that the base plate connection was a hybrid hinge, but admitted 
that some moment would nevertheless be transmitted to the slab. 
Also, this witness did not perform an analysis of the structure, but 
had been asked only to evaluate the foundation. Therefore, he did 
not attempt to calculate the magnitude of the moments. 
The intermediate soldier columns, the gable frame columns, 
and the end wall columns were analyzed in order to determine the 
force and moment reactions transmitted to the foundation slab. 
Braces at the top restrained the intermediate soldier columns. 
Therefore, the amount of moment transmitted to the slab by 
the column base plate depends on the amount of displacement at 
the top of the column. The displacement under load was un­
known, so two limiting cases were analyzed. The displacement 
would be between zero with full restraint against displacement at 
the top of the column, and 57.4 mm (2.26 in.) with no restraint. 
Since the actual amount of restraint provided by the top braces 
was difficult to determine, the two limiting cases of no and full 
restraint were analyzed in order to bracket the solution. 
With those two limiting cases, the moment reaction applied to 
the foundation slab would be between 738 and 1,840 kN-m (544 
and 1,360 in.-kips) for the full restraint and no restraint cases, 
respectively. The force reaction at the base of the column would 
be between 50.3 kN (11,300 lbs) with full restraint and 63.2 kN 
(14,200 lbs) with no restraint. These reactions were determined 
using the force (or flexibility) method as described by Hibbeler 
(1990, 1991). 
Frame analysis to determine the force reactions and moments 
at the base of the gable frame columns was complicated because 
the columns were tapered members. It is common in the metal 
building industry to use tapered members to improve economy 
(Lee et al. 1981; MBMA 1996). In this case, the gable frame 
column was 864 mm (34 in.) deep at the top and 533 mm (21 in.) 
deep at the base. 
The gable frame column reactions were developed using the 
direct stiffness method as described by Hibbeler (1990), with 
modifications for tapered structural members determined by the 
Portland Cement Association (PCA 1958). The frame was as­
sumed to be loaded symmetrically, with cottonseed pushing out­
ward against both side walls simultaneously. The analysis pre­
dicted a force reaction of 29.8 kN (6,710 lbs) and a moment 
reaction of 1,130 kN-m (831 in.-kips) at the column base. 
End wall column reactions could be determined in the same 
way as the side wall intermediate soldier columns, because these 
columns were fixed at the base and restrained at the top—in this 
case, by the roof. However, since all of these columns were taller 
than the side wall columns, the force and moment reactions would 
be higher. Total force acting on the end wall is proportional to the 
column height squared, as indicated by Eq. (2), so for the tallest 
column at the ridge line the moment reaction would be at least 
3,640 kN-m (2,600 in.-kips) and the force reaction would be at 
least 241 kN (54,100 lbs), using the fully restrained case. If the 
flexibility of the connection at the roof were considered, the base 
reactions would increase. 
For determining the effect of the column reactions on the con­
crete slab foundation, if the lowest force and moment reactions 
exceed the available material and structural capacity, it is not 
necessary to consider the larger forces. Therefore, the foundation 
was analyzed for a force reaction of 50.3 kN (11,300 lbs) and a 
moment reaction of 738 kN-m (544 in.-kips). 
Concrete Slab Foundation 
The failure of the concrete slab could have been due to three 
factors: 
• Inadequate concrete strength, 
• Insufficient slab reinforcement, and/or 
• High forces imparted to the foundation. 
To evaluate whether inadequate concrete strength was a con­
tributing factor, the core test strength results were compared with 
the ACI building code requirement. The code states in section 
5.6.4.4 that core strength is adequate if the average of at least 
three cores is at least 85% of the required compressive strength, 
and every core is at least 75% of the required compressive 
strength (ACI 1995). The core test results reported exceeded these 
values. Therefore, there was no reason to suspect that the concrete 
delivered did not meet the job specification. Unfortunately, there 
was no record of any cylinders made or tested on this project. 
Moreover, the critical stresses imposed on the foundation were 
tension imposed by column base forces and moments, not com­
pression. No reinforcement was shown in the interior of the slab 
to resist these forces. The ACI building code states in section 
10.2.5 that the tensile strength of concrete shall be neglected in 
axial and flexural calculations, and thus requires steel reinforce­
ment to resist tensile forces (ACI 1995). The design clearly vio­
lated the code. The polypropylene fibers can provide crack con­
trol, but do not meet the requirement for tension reinforcement. 
As the last step in the analysis of the slab, the concrete tensile 
and flexural stresses imposed at the column bases were consid­
ered. For the 27.6 MPa (4,000 psi) compressive strength speci­
fied, tensile and flexural strength would be approximately 4,500 
kPa (650 psi) (Mindess and Young 1981). Using the lowest col­
umn force and moment reactions determined earlier, the concrete 
slab stress would be 7,500 kPa (1,090 psi), well in excess of 
concrete strength. Therefore, the unreinforced concrete slab was 
cracked by the forces and moments imposed by the steel struc­
ture, bending outward from the pressure of the cottonseed. 
Another foundation deficiency was that the 406 mm (16 in.) 
edge beam was not thick enough to provide the required 635 mm 
(25 in.) of embedment for the column anchor bolts. Since the 
anchor bolts did not pull out, this deficiency does not seem to 
have contributed to the failure. The expert witness retained by the 
metal building manufacturer testified that the foundation was also 
deficient in other respects. 
Column Flange Braces 
Review of the structural design documents indicated that the 
flange braces were intended to prevent lateral-torsional buckling 
of the columns. The analysis of the load path, discussed above, 
noted that the cottonseed forces were transferred to the columns 
through these braces as well as through the girt clips. The flange 
braces were more than twice as stiff as the girt clips, so they 
would take carry about 2/3 of the tensile forces as the walls were 
pushed outward by the cottonseed. 
Therefore, an analysis was performed to determine whether 
the flange brace damage was due to the cottonseed loading. The 
American Iron and Steel Institute (AISI 1996) provides tables that 
may be used to determine the shear and pullout strength of screws 
installed into cold-formed steel members. Capacities were deter­
mined for a pair of #12 screws installed through the liner into a 
1.9 mm (0.075 in.) thick cold-formed Z-section purlin. Assuming 
higher-grade steel (448 MPa or 65 ksi), each screw capacity was 
11.6 kN (2,610 lbs) in shear and 4 kN (895 lbs) in pullout tension. 
The grade of steel was unknown. 
The tensile forces in the lateral braces increased linearly from 
the top to the bottom of each column. The bottom flange attach­
ments on the side walls and end walls were considerably over­
stressed. The lowest brace had an axial force of 24.5 kN (5,500 
lbs) and transmitted shear and tensile forces to the screw of 17.3 
kN (3,890 lbs) each. Both pullout tension and shear capacities are 
exceeded, without considering interaction. Use of lower strength 
screws would make this deficiency worse. 
Therefore, the pattern of damage to the flange braces shown in 
Figs. 2 and 4 was most probably due the outward force of the 
cottonseed. Other damage mechanisms were suggested, such as 
downward drag of the cottonseed or impact by forklifts. The 
former would have imposed much smaller forces than the out­
ward cottonseed pressure, and the latter seemed unlikely in view 
of the extent and pattern of the damage. 
Intermediate Soldier Column Top Brace 
In each warehouse, one of the interior columns nearest the end 
wall showed damage at the top. In warehouse 1, the top of a 
column was shown outward, as shown in Fig. 3. In warehouse 2, 
one of the braces holding in the top of a column was torn away 
(Fig. 6). Analysis using both the Allowable Stress Design (ASD) 
and Load and Resistance Factor Design (LRFD) provisions of the 
American Institute of Steel Construction (AISC 1986, 1989) in­
dicated that the connections for the braces were inadequate. Each 
brace had a maximum force of 20.5 kN (4,600 lbs), but the ca­
pacity at the slotted hole was only 9.3 kN (2,090 lbs). In the metal 
building manufacturer’s job file, a document entitled ‘‘Correction 
Warranty’’ was found for replacing the two-part brace with a 
single continuous member, with a larger steel cross section. This 
document suggested that at some point, the metal building manu­
facturer realized that this detail was deficient. 
Overall Stability 
The damage mechanisms discussed so far are local, leading to 
distress but perhaps not the overall collapse of the structure. How­
ever, differential cottonseed loading would lead to a major danger 
of collapse. Moreover, the method used to load the structure guar­
anteed differential loading. As the cottonseed is blown into the far 
end of the building, the pile extends at a 45° angle. Thus, the far 
end wall becomes fully loaded before any cottonseed reaches the 
front end wall. 
The total force resultant of 1,670 kN (375 kips) was resisted 
by x-bracing in the end bays of the side walls. The braces for the 
left side end bay may be seen in Fig. 2. A total of four sets of 
braces resisted the force, and braces in compression were ne­
glected in the writer’s analysis due to their slenderness. 
Based on the AISC ASD provisions (AISC 1989), the required 
rod brace diameter would be 89 mm (3.55 in.) for 248 MPa (36 
ksi) steel and 73 mm (2.87 in.) for 379 MPa (55 ksi) steel. The 
required brace diameter is much greater than that provided. 
Discussion 
On the basis of the analysis, the writer concluded that the steel 
structure design and the foundation design were both deficient. 
Construction errors and inadequate soil compaction seemed to 
have played little or no role in the failure. 
Review of the metal building manufacturer’s plan and job file 
indicated that the cottonseed forces were never accounted for in 
design, although they were listed on the table of reactions for 
foundation design. This was a serious omission, because the cot­
tonseed forces were much higher than the forces considered in 
design, and represented the controlling load case. Under the cot­
tonseed loads, a number of the metal building structural elements 
were overstressed and damaged, and the structure was in danger 
of overall collapse. Therefore, the steel structure design was in­
adequate. 
The foundation design was also inadequate and violated the 
ACI building code. The registered engineer who designed the 
foundation slab had not previously designed a foundation. He also 
missed some of the force reaction notations on the steel structure 
plans. This engineer was clearly operating outside of his area of 
expertise—nearly all of his recent experience had been in the 
preparation of soil test reports and recommendations for labora­
tory A and its clients. 
A contributing factor was the practice of splitting responsibil­
ity for the structure and the foundation between two engineers. 
Neither took responsibility for the overall project. The metal 
building manufacturer’s engineer disavowed responsibility for the 
foundation and provided incomplete information on the column 
base reactions. The foundation engineer misinterpreted some of 
the notations that were provided. Because of the high outward 
pressures imposed by the cottonseed, careful coordination of 
building design and foundation design was needed to ensure sat­
isfactory performance. A single engineer of record could have 
prevented this failure of communication. The only common con­
tact between the two engineers was the building owner. 
During the writer’s original inspection, the owner led the 
writer through a fifty-year-old metal cottonseed storage ware­
house near warehouse 1. The difference between the older build­
ing and the newer buildings was striking. The structural members 
were much thicker, and thick steel cables anchored the walls to 
eyebolts embedded in the concrete foundation. Clearly, the out­
ward forces imposed by the cottonseed had been considered in the 
design of the older building. This building had given decades of 
trouble-free service. 
Conclusions 
Stored agricultural products such as cottonseed or peanuts impose 
significant outward pressures on warehouse walls. These forces 
may be predicted using standard soil mechanics equations. As 
demonstrated above, calculating these pressures is straightfor­
ward. 
Since at least three of these warehouses have failed in the 
same predictable manner, counting the building observed earlier 
by the building owner, it is clearly important for designers of 
future agricultural product warehouses to consider these forces in 
design. It is particularly important to considered overall structural 
stability under unbalanced product loads. 
It is also necessary to make sure that the designer’s assump­
tions about structural behavior are consistent with the detailing. 
The column base connections were fixed, but were modeled as if 
hinged. Either a fixed or hinged connection could have been used, 
and the structure could have performed properly with either 
detail—so long as the structure and foundation designs took the 
actual connection behavior into account. Instead, the moment that 
cracked the foundation slab was not accounted for by either the 
structural engineer or the foundation engineer. 
The practice of splitting responsibility for a structure between 
a manufacturer’s structural engineer (who may know nothing 
about the site conditions) and a local foundation engineer (who 
may know nothing about metal building design and behavior) 
presents a high risk of failure. It is particularly dangerous when 
loads of the magnitudes discussed in this paper are present. A 
single engineer of record is needed in order to avoid poor perfor­
mance due to poor communication. 
A few hours before leaving the office to testify in the case, the 
writer was informed that the case had been settled. The settlement 
was confidential, and the terms were not disclosed to the writer. 
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